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JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN IN-
TERNMENT CASES. By Peter Irons. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 1983. Pp. xiii, 407. $18.95. 
Peter Irons's1 Justice at War adds new evidence to the extensive 
array of literature2 attacking the internment of Japanese Americans 
1. Peter Irons is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California at 
San Diego, and is the author of THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982). 
2. For scathing condemnations of the Supreme Court's decisions, see Dembitz, Racial .Dis-
crimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo .Decisions, 
45 COLUM. L. REv. 175 (1945); Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A .Disaster, 54 YALE 
L.J. 489 (1945); see also M. GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED 354 (1949); J. TENBROEK, E. 
BARNHART AND F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1954); Freeman, 
Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus: Genealogy, Evacuation and Law, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 414 
(1943). In the years since Dembitz's and Rostow's articles were published, "not a single legal 
scholar or writer has attempted a substantive defense of the Supreme Court opinions." P. 371. 
Despite the government's claim that the evacuation was a military necessity, numerous authors 
have argued not only that hindsight has shown that this was not in fact the case, but also that 
the military knew or at least should have known the falsity of the claim at the time of the 
evacuation. See, e.g., F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY (1962); M. GRODZINS, supra; C. MC-
WILLIAMS, WHAT ABOUT OUR JAPANESE-AMERICANS? {1944); J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & 
F. MATSON, supra; Freeman, supra; Rostow, supra. But see WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY, 
U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PHAsES OF THE WRA PROGRAM 
(1946). Further, a recent congressionally established commission investigated the internment 
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during World War II and the Supreme Court cases that sanctioned 
the internment.3 In Justice at War, Irons focuses on lawyers who 
could have prevented the internment tragedy - those who had sig-
nificant connections with the original evacuation decisions and the 
court cases testing those decisions. He takes for granted, and indeed 
one might hope, that those lawyers should have been sufficiently 
principled to ignore the clear prejudice that motivated the intern-
ment, competent enough to recognize the constitutional rights that 
the internment violated, and sufficiently dedicated and independent 
to pursue a course that would vindicate those rights. Yet that clearly 
did not happen, and Irons is able to document convincingly "a delib-
erate campaign to present tainted records to the Supreme Court" (p. 
-viii) in the cases that upheld the government's actions. In fact, based 
on the evidence Irons uncovered while researching his book, he and 
other attorneys have sought to reverse the wartime convictions of 
Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minoru Yasui4 by using 
the ancient writ of co ram nob is, which allows a court to reverse its 
initial decision if that decision was affected by fundamental error or 
a party's misconduct. Irons asserts that the record he has uncovered 
reveals "a legal scandal without precedent in the history of Ameri-
can law'' (p. viii). Regardless of the accuracy of this statement, Irons 
presents strong documentation of a scandal of vast proportions. 
On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Or-
der 9066 authorizing the Secretary of War to prescribe military areas 
and to exclude " 'any or all persons' " (p. 48) from those areas. In 
the Internment Cases, the government was forced to defend this or-
der, as well as the congressional action and military orders that fol-
lowed it, in the face of exclusionary measures directed solely toward 
Japanese Americans. The government argued that "military neces-
sity" justified applying those measures to a single class of citizens. 
The purported military necessity was based on the notion that Japa-
nese Americans were predisposed to disloyalty, sabotage, and espio-
nage because of their distinctive racial characteristics. Given the 
complete absence of hard evidence that any Japanese American had 
menaced national security either before or after Pearl Harbor (pp. 
145-46, 179), the government had a difficult task buttressing its 
arguments. 
(soliciting Irons' testimony) and similarly concluded that no military necessity existed. The 
commission attributed the evacuation and internment primarily to political pressures. See 
REPORT OF THE COMMN. ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PER• 
SONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1982). 
3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding conviction for violating 
military order directing exclusion from "Military Area" by remaining in the area); Hiraba-
yashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding conviction for violations of military 
curfew); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) (same). 
4. See note 3 supra. 
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To overcome this difficulty, Irons argues, government attorneys 
crossed the boundary of legitimate advocacy and entered into the 
realm of deceit (p. ix). Irons leaves little doubt in his exceedingly 
well-documented account that at the time of the exclusion the mili-
tary knew the falsity of a number of the "facts" on which it was 
relying to show "military necessity." Additionally, though Justice 
Department lawyers who represented the government discovered 
that the military knew the falsity of some of its claims, they failed to 
inform the Court.5 Thus, this is not simply a case where the benefits 
of hindsight clearly reveal that a mistake has been made. 
While Justice at War does more than delineate acts of attorney 
misconduct, 6 it is with these acts that Irons is primarily concerned. 
In them, he sees "profound questions of legal ethics and professional 
responsibility" (p. ix). Although the code of legal ethics requires a 
lawyer to represent his or her client's interests zealously, it also 
demands that lawyers "function as officers of the courts, sworn to 
canons of fairness and justice" (p. ix). Lawyers may only present the 
courts with evidence they know to be truthful. Irons clearly demon-
strates that government lawyers breached this latter duty by failing 
to inform the courts of the questionable validity of evidence in-
tended to justify the military's actions. 
Justice at War also examines the ethical dilemmas that faced 
some of the government lawyers when what they perceived as their 
professional responsibility conflicted with their personal beliefs. 
Each of the government lawyers involved felt this conflict differently, 
but for all, in the end, personal qualms bowed to the "demands of 
5. The accuracy of this grave charge appears to have been confirmed by the Justice De-
partment's response to the claims recently filed against it in the challenge to Korematsu and by 
the judge's determination of that challenge. The charge against the government was that it 
had knowingly presented false evidence of the existence of a "military necessity." On October 
4, 1983, the government joined Irons and Korematsu's other attorneys in requesting that the 
Court set aside the conviction. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1983, at A24, coL 1. In mid-November, 
Federal District Judge Patel did so. Although the Justice Department did not admit to any 
governmental misconduct - it stated instead that it was not fighting the case because the 
evacuation program was "an unfortunate episode in our nation's history" that should be "put 
behind us" - Judge Patel interpreted the Justice Department's conciliatory approach to be 
tantamount to a confession of error. The Supreme Court's decision, she stated, was "based on 
unsubstantiated facts, distortions and misrepresentations." Bad Landmark, TIME, Nov. 21, 
1983, at 51. 
In 1983, bills were introduced and referred to the judiciary committees in both houses of 
Congress to provide for payments to certain Japanese Americans and others who were de-
tained, interned or relocated by the United States during World War II. See S. 1520, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 2116, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3387, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1983); H.R. 4110, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
6. In addition to exploring these instances of misconduct, Irons depicts the influence of 
political pressures in the government's decisions to begin and end the evacuation. He illumi-
nates the tactical disputes among the lawyers on both sides, disputes that indicate what these 
lawyers thought about the various justifications for the actions taken and about the conflict 
between institutional loyalty and personal conscience. He also discusses the lawyers' argu-
ments before the courts and the courts' subsequent deliberations and opinions. 
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duty" (p. 350). As Irons shows, the conflict for a government lawyer 
may be particularly acute, because he or she has a dual professional 
responsibility "as the advocate for his federal client and as defender 
of the Constitution" (p. 350). 
Irons focuses on Edward Ennis, a Justice Department lawyer 
with a major role in formulating the government's positions in the 
test cases. Ennis personified the conflict between professional obli-
gation and personal conscience because, unlike many others, he did 
not simply·view the War Department, which was promulgating and 
enforcing military orders pursuant to Roosevelt's Executive Order, 
as his client. He objected to the notion that the Justice Department 
should passively offer all the arguments that the War Department 
told it to make without exercising some independent judgment. 
Ennis distrusted the War Department's claims and believed the 
evacuation and internment were unconstitutional, yet there was a 
limit to what he would do to back up those beliefs. He considered, 
but decided against, resigning when the evacuation decision was first 
made (p. 62). Later, while defending the government's actions in the 
courts, he believed the government was obliged to be frank and to 
confess the doubts it felt about the military's position. Unable to 
prevail within the government, Ennis went behind the scenes and 
actually undercut the government's position by helping to shape the 
opposition's legal strategy (pp. 182, 302-05). Again, however, Ennis 
chose not to resign and signed the government's Korematsu brief "as 
a sign of institutional loyalty'' (p. 302). Thus, despite Ennis's belief 
that the internment was immoral and unconstitutional, he eventually 
capitulated and supported his client - the government. Ennis has 
attempted to account for his defense of programs he personally op-
posed; he stressed the demands of duty, explaining that he had seen 
it as his responsibility to state his position and then do the job deter-
mined by his superiors (p. 350). But Irons questions Ennis's ap-
proach, believing that more forceful action by Ennis might have 
altered the unfortunate outcome of Korematsu (p. 351). 
Two of the incidents of governmental misconduct that Irons doc-
uments best illustrate the difficulty Ennis and his assistant, John 
Burling, faced in attempting to merge their personal and profes-
sional roles. First, while preparing the Hirabayashi brief, Ennis 
learned that the intelligence agency responsible for advising General 
John De Witt, the ranking west coast military figure, had told the 
General that selective evacuation of Japanese Americans was prefer-
able to mass evacuation. Ennis told the Solicitor General, who had 
control over the briefs, that since they were now defending the army 
on the basis that selective evacuation had been impracticable, they 
had to consider what their obligation to the Court was "in view of 
the fact that the responsible intelligence agency regarded a selective 
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evacuation . . as preferable" (p. 204). Ennis warned that failure to 
advise the Court of the existence of this information might "approxi-
mate the suppression of evidence" (p. 204). But even though the 
final brief stated the opposite of the intelligence agency's conclusion, 
Ennis, as a loyal government lawyer, "swallowed his doubts and 
added his name to the . . . brief' (p. 206). 
A second conflict arose when FBI and FCC reports ordered by 
the Justice Department at Ennis's prompting cast doubt on the accu-
racy of claims that some Japanese Americans were spying and sig-
nalling to offshore submarines. General De Witt had made. such 
claims in a document entitled Final Report, Japanese Evacuation 
From the West Coast, 1942. The FBI and FCC reports showed that 
De Witt knew that the statements about the radio signalling were 
false both at the time he recommended the evacuation and at the 
time he included the charges in the Final Report as a central reason 
for the evacuation (p. 284). In a draft of their brief, Burling and 
Ennis included a footnote that would have notified the Court that 
the Final Report's claims about illegal radio transmitters and signal-
ling conflicted with information that the Justice Department pos-
sessed. Heated debates between and within the Justice and War 
Departments ensued, in which Burling and Ennis argued that the 
government had an ethical obligation not to cite the Final Report. 
But the final footnote, though subtly expressing some doubts about 
the veracity of parts of the Final Report, contained no reference to 
specific conflicting information (p. 292). And again, despite their 
vehement disagreement with the decision not to express forthrightly 
the existence of these "lies" to the Court, Ennis and Burling signed 
the brief. "Institutional loyalty had prevailed over personal con-
science" (p. 292). 
Though Irons states that Justice at War "is not intended as a 
brief' (p. xii) on behalf of the clients he is now representing, at times 
the style of the book resembles a brief in its overt, and to this reader 
successful, attempt to persuade. This argumentativeness detracts a 
bit from the sense of outrage that Irons tries to convey, especially 
since the facts themselves are sufficient to make the point. Yet de-
spite the tenor of advocacy conveyed by comments such as "a legal 
scandal of unprecedented scope and consequence" (p. 254), Irons's 
conclusions, though forcefully stated, can hardly be doubted. To 
Irons, "the historical record of the Japanese American wartime 
cases," supports ''the conclusion that their outcome reflected the fail-
ure of the legal system" (p. 365). 
